

To: HooperSecretariat@ipo.gov.uk

10 February 2012

**CALL FOR EVIDENCE: THE DIGITAL COPYRIGHT EXCHANGE FEASIBILITY STUDY
RESPONSE FROM THE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION**

Introduction

1. The Publishers Association ('the PA') is the representative body for the book, journal, audio and electronic publishers in the UK. Our membership of 120 companies spans the academic, education and trade sectors, comprising small and medium enterprises through to global companies. The PA's members annually account for around £4.6bn of revenue, with £3.1bn derived from the sales of books and £1.5bn from the sales of learned journals.
2. The PA is fully supportive of the feasibility study into the creation of a Digital Copyright Exchange (DCE) and we welcome this opportunity to provide our views to the Secretariat. We also greatly appreciate the time which the Secretariat has devoted to meeting with all parts of the creative sector in gathering views and engaging in discussion as part of the study. We hope that it has, or will, lead to a clear mutual understanding of the issues and aims in play.
3. Conducting this initial diagnostic phase will provide the opportunity to more closely analyse the premises and conclusions of the Hargreaves Review, and start to bring some definition to the nature of a proposed solution in the second phase.
4. The PA fully endorses the submissions to the Study given by the Publishers Licensing Society and the Copyright Licensing Agency.

What the DCE Should Be

5. The PA, along with a number of other bodies, wrote in support of a DCE type body in our response to the Hargreaves Review submitted in March 2011. The case we made there, we repeat in response to this Study, and outlines what our members identify as current problems with licensing and how they might be resolved:

"The efficient functioning of the creative economy depends upon the easy exchange and interchange of intellectual property. The ability of rightsholders to licence assignments of their rights to others is the fundamental cornerstone of the whole business operation.

"Licensing copyright necessitates negotiation. This, in turn, requires there to be a mutual agreement upon what constitutes a fair price for the deal: too high and the buyer will walk away and find other works to exploit; too low and the owner of the rights will find someone else to work with. Negotiation must also not be too protracted or difficult. If the transaction costs – in terms of time and money – are too high, then the deal may not be worth doing; especially if the works are of such a nature that effective exploitation requires a speedy entry to market.

"It is these two factors: price and complexity, which lie at the heart of a great deal which is currently problematic in the operation of the creative economy and which, if

even partially solved, would do much to reduce the demands for radical copyright reform.

“The European Publishers Council is developing a proposal designed to deal with the complexity of licensing. It centres around the thesis that whilst copyright law is entirely fit for the digital environment, traditional copyright practice for the management of rights is looking outdated for automated processes and licensing. A solution would work with the grain of technology and create —machine readable copyright permissions, which would have the effect of rendering the complexities of licensing invisible to the user/consumer, but would nevertheless ensure the functioning of the system of incentives and rewards which underpin copyright.

*“A technological solution would perform the essential tasks of **managing data** (which would need to be well-structured and standardised) and use it to **automate the processes** surrounding rights and permissions. This data, which currently exists, but in peripheral and often non-standard formats, needs to come centre stage. It should allow the identification of the content being used; who controls the rights in it; the user and the usage; and then to link that data together to **facilitate a transaction**. The rights databases would thus need to be integral both with message infrastructure and transactional systems.”*

“Driving Innovation, Delivering Growth”

*The Publishers Association Submission to the Independent Review of IP and Growth,
March 2011.*

6. Further to this analysis, we fully concur with the Government’s view as articulated in its Response to the Hargreaves Review (August 2011) that the DCE would need to:

- have a **“critical mass”** of material.

For the DCE to fulfil its potential it will have to be regarded as a true “one stop shop” where the user’s assumption will be that they will find information about practically any work in which they are interested. A DCE which has a poor catalogue would very quickly lose the appeal and trust of users and wither on the vine.

- be **non-compulsory** for rightsholders.

Moral rights, commercial logic and international law all point towards the DCE being an entirely voluntary system for authors and publishers alike. Any notion that a work has to be notified to the DCE would fall foul of Berne Convention regulations forbidding “formalities” in copyright; and would be clearly at odds with the exclusive rights of creators to decide how their work is used. Whilst it is possible that the voluntary requirement could sit at odds with the need for a critical mass of material it will be essential that those charged with designing and executing the creation of the system have the full trust and support from rightsholders at the outset.

- allow **prices to be set or negotiated** by the rightsholder.

To which we would add: “where appropriate”. In line with the non-compulsion arguments above, it would be at variance with the normal operation of

copyright and a dramatic example of state intervention into a market if there was to be any suggestion of prices being decided by anyone other than the parties to a licensing agreement.

- *be **open to access** by individuals and businesses and free at the point of use;*

Axiomatically, the DCE has to be a fully public system with no costs incurred simply by perusing the portal. The exact financial arrangements should be worked through in the second phase of the feasibility study.

- *be operated on a **self funding** basis.*

It seems appropriate that only those rightsholders whose work is on the DCE should be liable for any of its costs, and furthermore that only those who come to licensing arrangements as a result of being on the DCE should bear at least the majority of costs. But again, the details of these arrangements should be a matter for the subsequent phase of study.

7. To those stipulations we would add that the DCE should:

- *have **optimal compatibility** across different media content types and national systems, commensurate with the technical ability to combine and operate existing systems.*

It is a salient feature of the creative sector that different forms of work have given rise to different licensing systems and conditions. However, digital technology has increased the incidence of users wishing to license content from across different media and across international borders. In the publishing sector, territoriality is a critical feature in allowing the maximum flexibility in licensing rights. Rights can be assigned to different partners in different countries, or areas of the world, according to the specialisms and expertise of different publishers. To be of any benefit to users or rightsholders, it is imperative that from the outset the DCE is able to meet this demand.

- *be capable of **differentiating** across the full range of rights and usages, covering both primary and secondary licensing.*

Equally, different media types can be put to very different uses – and the more uses which can be identified the greater the licensing opportunities for creators, and the greater flexibility can be provided to the user. The DCE should not be restricted to either primary or secondary licensing (the definitions of which in any case vary across different media types) but should be capable of accommodating whichever rights and uses the rightsholder wishes to help facilitate.

- be a **consumer facing** portal.

Whereas larger business-to-business transactions are relatively easy to facilitate and where both parties have high levels of knowledge, the engagement of smaller businesses or individuals is more problematic. As we note further below, for many users, especially the young, licensing is an “unknown unknown” – they are simply unaware of the need or existence of it. The DCE could play a leading role in promoting education and awareness of the importance of licensing (thus along the way having an impact on reducing online copyright infringement) and in creating a better relationship between users and creators. The DCE site should also deliver constant reminders to users that licenses are likely to be allocated for specific usages and that these boundaries need to be respected at all times.

It would also be likely to bring great benefits in the sometimes vexed relationships between creative companies and internet intermediaries, such as internet service providers and search engines. This sign-posting function of the DCE should greatly determine the quality of the interface of the end solution.

What the DCE Should Not Be

8. Where we diverge from the Government’s view, however, is in its stance that the DCE should be a “genuine marketplace independent of sellers and purchasers, rather than simply being an aggregated rights database”. This aim seems to be totally at cross-purposes with the requirement that prices be set or negotiated by rightsholders (a principle accepted by the Government in their response to the Hargreaves Review). Since different usages will require different licence terms, it would be impossible for the DCE to simply display a set tariff for rights – especially within current UK competition rules. Or rather, if this is all the DCE did, it would be a very blunt and non-useful instrument.
9. Nor do we agree with the sentiment expressed in the Hargreaves Review that engagement with the DCE should be seen as quid pro quo for enforcing rights through vehicles such as the Digital Economy Act provisions. Notwithstanding that this implies creating formalities to copyright which would be illegal in international law, it would appear to go against the fundamental grain of voluntary participation. Being made an offer one can’t refuse, is not really an offer at all.
10. The DCE should not be expected by rightsholders to act as a policeman for infringement. The licensing deals which may be negotiated following participation on the DCE must be respected and if not, the terms enforced. But it should remain, as now, the job of the rightsholder to ensure compliance, and not an additional function of the DCE. It will be challenging enough to establish and operate the facilitation of licensing, let alone policing the usage as well.
11. *Pace* the Government’s view, the DCE *should* be an aggregated rights database, but with the additional functionality of allowing potential licensees to link directly to rightsholders to begin negotiations over usage. The DCE might also be designed to facilitate the fully automated usage of rights, where rightsholders have given prior consent for this to happen. The concept of the DCE as a fully-fledged trading platform may be attractive to some companies and sectors, and they would be at liberty to

pursue that capability with respect to their rights. But the fundamental principle of the voluntary nature of the DCE must be preserved.

12. Whether or not one buys into every aspect of the Hargreaves analysis on the current problems with licensing, we support the premise that improvements can be made to streamline how digital content is licensed.

Engagement with the Policy Process

13. The PA's support for the development of the DCE comes despite, not because of, the Hargreaves Review's analysis of copyright in the digital age. As we outline in response to the questions in Section 1 below, we believe a great deal of the Review's analysis was unsound, under-researched and prejudiced against the interests of rightsholders. We will be setting out our detailed arguments on this in our response to the Intellectual Property Office's Consultation on Copyright.
14. In that response we set out the view that the development of the DCE will be hampered if the Government's parallel legislative reforms, which will weaken copyright for rightsholders, continues. Licensors may be less likely to engage in a project to make rights more available online if there is the prospect (a very real one if the IPO has its way) of exceptions being widened and the opportunities for licensing copyright works diminished. For example, the IPO Consultation points to the prospect of licensing for educational recording, content mining, educational reprographic copying and cloud-usage all disappearing. This sits at variance with the ambition of the DCE to improve licensing.
15. Furthermore, the radical approach to amending copyright law set out by the IPO may prove to be unnecessary should the DCE be made operational. Many of the concerns the Hargreaves Review articulated with the operation of copyright could be solved by an operational DCE alone. We are therefore urging Government to suspend progress with its proposed legislative solutions until such time as the professed aims of the DCE can be demonstrated to be feasible and deliverable, or not.
16. This is especially the case with regards to the proposed exceptions on content mining and future technology, which require amendments to the European Union Information Society Directive. As these changes cannot be made by the UK Government, they are not considered in the current Consultation on Copyright. Nevertheless, IPO Officials are already briefing their counterparts at the EU on the purported benefits that such changes will bring, despite the fact that they have not been subject to economic analysis or consultation. All such activity should be stopped until the DCE has been given a full opportunity to demonstrate its potential worth.

Section 1: The Hargreaves Hypothesis

17. Before engaging with the detailed hypothesis, it is worth noting the weakness of the economic evidence which Hargreaves provides in support of the DCE. Hargreaves claims that the creation of the DCE would lead to £2.2bn of growth (the single biggest growth effect of any of the recommendations, which in total are estimated to create £5.5bn of growth). To arrive at this figure, the Hargreaves Review Document EE's assessment of Copyright Licensing draws heavily upon the Copenhagen Economics Study "*Economic Impact of Digital Single Market*", in particular the Study's finding that an improved Digital Single Market could lead to an increase of GDP of 4%. This is

then used as the basis for a calculation of the growth impact of creating a Digital Copyright Exchange.

18. However, this extrapolation is both tenuous and tendentious. In arriving at the 4% figure, the Copenhagen Study made clear that a whole range of policy outcomes would need to be achieved, including improvements in areas such as skills, e-commerce, consumer trust, changes in productivity and employment, cultural differences within the EU, and changes in the working practices of the public sector. The IP licensing regime is simply one small part of this (indeed research quoted in the study sees “content and copyright” as 6th out of 13 barriers to growth, with no specific reference to licensing).
19. Hence, the most important element of the Hargreaves assessment is based on the mis-application of the growth impact of a wide range of policy measures, to just a single measure, which was at best a peripheral focus of the Study. Hargreaves asserts that the benefits of all elements could be gained by implementing just one. Hargreaves draws a totally imaginary line between policy and outcome and the reasoning cannot bear the weight of the conclusion placed upon it.
20. Furthermore, Hargreaves’ hypothesis ironically suffers from the very failings he tries to pin on copyright: that it is out of date. Hargreaves’ study did not adequately account for the very rapid developments that are taking place in licensing across the creative industries, be it for content mining, cloud storage, IPTV or new protocols such as the film industry’s *Ultraviolet*. Had the Hargreaves analysis taken such progress into account it would have had the basis to form a more positive view of the role of licensing in enabling users to access creative content and in a way which does not undermine existing revenue streams and economic growth.
21. The DCE Feasibility Study invites views on the Hargreaves hypothesis which sets out seven reasons as to why copyright licensing is not fit for purpose in the digital age. We respond to each of these as follows:

(i) *Expensive (both the licensing process and the cost of rights)*

It is hugely welcome that this Study draws attention to the distinction between the cost of the licensing process and the cost of the licence to use the underlying rights. Too often in this debate – and not least in the Hargreaves Review itself – these quite distinct concepts are elided.

In terms of the process costs, it is in the interests of all sides to reduce these as far as possible – though they can never be zero. The economies of scale which can be achieved by collecting societies mean that greater cost effectiveness will be achieved where licensing is done by one body, rather than a number of bodies, each with their own systems and costs (a situation of licensing “many-to-many”). As to whether such costs are “too high” is for the market to determine. Rightsholders have no interest in them being high, as the running costs of collecting societies are subtracted from the royalty streams paid through to members. Collecting societies are responsible to their members (through their boards) to keep operating costs to a minimum and to deliver the maximum value back to rightsholders. Obviously, licensees have the same motivation to see costs as low as possible. So licensing is a market in which both buyer and seller have a clear vested interest in keeping the transaction costs to a minimum. It is therefore difficult to anticipate what could be achieved by a market intervention to reduce transaction costs yet further.

As for the cost of the rights themselves, the price attached to a licence by rightsholders is a matter for negotiation. A rightsholder which places too high a premium on the use of their material will find it is not exploited to the same degree as they would were it lower. In some cases, this will be the desired effect. Some creators will only want to see their work used in certain special circumstances and pricing – together with a permissions system – is a valid way to maintain this control.

The essence of this debate lies around the concept of ownership. Hargreaves' analysis of copyright fails because it does not accept that copyright is a property right – and not a monopoly right - and sees it purely through an economic lens, as an incentive to invest or create. However it is well documented in UK and EU case law that copyright is, indeed, a property right and as such decisions around the use and control of the asset lies with the creator, the rights owner. Implicit in those decisions will be the price. There is a natural tension between owner and user over price that can only be resolved by negotiation. Would-be users of rights routinely decry the amount they are being asked to pay for them. But it is no different to the prices set by the owner-sellers of any other good: one would not walk into a supermarket and expect to pay only £5 for a whole trolley full of groceries.

For these reasons, we disagree with the Hargreaves hypothesis that rights are expensive.

(ii) *Difficult to use*

In any system there is a trade off to be made between simplicity and control - and generally they operate inversely to each other. A very simple licensing system (for example, a blanket compulsory licence) would deprive rightsholders of the ability to manage the usage of their work and could undermine their moral rights. On the other hand, to exercise control over each and every usage would be fiendishly complex. The balanced middle way requires a combination of voluntary collective licensing, permitting some general usage (such as limited photocopying) but reserving some usages for case-by-case decision making, such as whether to grant digital rights. (For example, some authors – notably children's author Julia Donaldson - believe strongly that their literary works should be enjoyed as print books, and not on e-readers. Any licensing system which glossed over a view of this sort would be sacrificing moral rights on the altar of simplification.)

That said, there is no doubt that the copyright licensing system – like any system – could be made easier to use. We accept that at a time when content is easy to search and discover, more should be done also to enhance the discoverability of rights to that content; ideally at the time and place users are interested to transact and to facilitate legal uses at fair market rates.

(iii) *Difficult to access*

Most large operations or professional business bodies wishing to access the licensing system for copyright works will not have difficulty doing so. The principal licensing agencies across the media sectors are well-known and advertised and in the age of the internet a would-be user should not remain in any state of ignorance for long.

The same may also be said of the majority of consumers, but it is recognised that certain groups (the young, for example) may not be aware of the licensing system. For them, the very concept of licensing may be an “unknown unknown”.

It is therefore not appropriate to suggest that this issue represents a systemic failing of the copyright licensing system – and thereby is a problem which the DCE could solve – when it may be more of a problem of communication and education. A putative young user could just as easily be in ignorance of the new DCE as of the existing PLS or PPL.

(iv) *Insufficiently transparent*

Again, a distinction must be drawn between the business or professional user and the individual consumer. The collecting societies in the publishing sector operate to very high standards of openness and transparency. It would have been interesting to see more detailed views from the IPO as to what their concerns are. Similarly, further principles are being adopted to enhance openness and transparency, not least at the European level, and quite separate to the DCE. We are awaiting an impact assessment for a framework Collective Management Directive which is likely to confirm best practice guidelines.

(v) *Siloed within individual media types*

This is a pejorative way of describing a reality of commercial life: different types of work are created by different people, supported by different companies. It is perfectly natural, reasonable and valid that music copyright should be dealt with in a different way to literary copyright. Publishing houses are specialists in identifying, supporting and marketing authors; the same is true in their own world of record companies and recording artists. These specialisms have given rise to different cultures, which has given rise to different markets and therefore to different licensing practices. Equally, different uses give rise to different licences, each with their own conditions appropriate to the requirements of the licensor. It is perfectly valid that a licence granted to a university to access a scientific publication may be different in kind to that negotiated with a large pharmaceutical company. It is simply not credible to attempt to blur this diversity out of existence. To do so represents a fatal misunderstanding of the distinction between different types of works; different types of licenses appropriate according to the work; and would potentially undermine creators’ rights, not least their moral rights.

(vi) *Victim to misalignment of incentives*

Again this would seem to be an unduly pejorative critique, and misdirected for the same reasons we note above. Copyright licensing involves a commercial negotiation between two or more parties wherein it is natural that the buyer and seller have divergent views on the appropriate price. Even where both sides agree that the transaction costs should be minimised (which as we note above is likely to be the case), it is unlikely that they would immediately agree on the costs of the licence itself. Furthermore, it is valid that there should be a divergence of views around use. The creator – as befits the owner of the work – will perhaps want to exert greater control over the use of the work, or impose stricter stipulations, than the licensee might ideally wish. This negotiation can often end well with a deal which suits both sides, or leave one side with a non-optimal deal, or there may be no deal at all. But that is a brute fact of commercial life. It is not entirely clear how Hargreaves envisages that this

commercial tension could ever be removed from the marketplace. Indeed, it would be extremely damaging if it were.

(vii) *Insufficiently international in focus and shape.*

In the same way that historic and cultural forces have led to different content types being managed and licensed in their own way, so too has the political-economic reality of nationhood given rise to different legal systems. Although moves to a single market in the EU are well underway, European copyright law is still susceptible to different legal interpretations and implementation regimes in different Member States (albeit now partly harmonised under the 2001 Copyright Directive). This naturally implies national systems. However, a great deal of voluntary work is already underway through projects like Europeana, Arrow Plus and the Global Rights Database to create trans-national registries to better facilitate licensing across international borders. Furthermore, we believe it is imperative that a DCE builds upon or alongside these initiatives and does not try to duplicate them.

(It should further be noted that publishing, like many creative sectors, has a highly successful, flourishing trade in international licensing. Would the Hooper Secretariat wish to visit the International Rights Centre at this year's London Book Fair (15-19 April at Earl's Court) they will see for themselves how copyright licensing in publishing could never seriously be described as "insufficiently international".)

22. The Feasibility Study invites comment on a further seven claims which are made as a result of the analysis in the Hargreaves Review, which depend upon agreement with some or all of the premises. As we note, we do not share all of these views.

(i) *The "size of the pie" for rightsholders is smaller than it could be*

According to a 2011 study by PricewaterhouseCooper commissioned by the CLA, ALCS, PLS and DACS ("An Economic Analysis of Copyright Secondary Copyright and Collective Licensing), the cost of the current collective system of £6.7m compares most favourably to £360m, the mid-range estimate for an atomised model. The CLA deducts an administration charge of 11%. Although international comparisons are very difficult given the differences in the way collecting societies operate in different parts of the world, there is little doubt that British publishing copyright licensing is highly efficient and ensures the optimal returns for rightsholders. As with many contentions made in the Hargreaves Review, evidence of the counter-factual case is not presented.

(ii) *The "share of the pie" going to rightsholders is smaller than it could be*

We believe that the UK's publishing collective societies are highly cost efficient. Whilst further marginal efficiencies can always be sought, there does not seem to be any evidence of a systemic underpayment.

(iii) *New digital businesses within the creative industries are being held back*

We do not see any evidence for this claim and it really is for the person making this claim to provide evidence for it. Given the high levels of innovation we perceive taking place in and around publishing – and which we showcased in detail in our submission to the Hargreaves Review – this would seem to us to be an unsustainable claim.

(iv) Innovation is being held back

Again, evidence is essential to support this claim. If one considers the huge levels of innovation which have been going on in digital publishing for at least the past 20 years this seems, on the face of it, to be a preposterous assertion.

(v) Infringement of copyrighted content remains persistent

Yes it does, but what is the link that is being inferred? How would a functioning DCE solve the problem of infringement? This argument would seem to be a non sequitur.

(vi) The end user is deprived of access to a significant amount of commercially and culturally valuable content

Again, there is no evidential backing to justify use of the word “significant”. Whilst it is undoubtedly true that on occasion problems in the copyright licensing system will prevent some works being exploited for certain purposes, there is no evidence of widespread or systemic market failure; nor is there evidence that the creation of a DCE would necessarily resolve all residual problems.

(vii) UK GDP should grow an extra £2bn a year if barriers were reduced.

We scrutinise this claim in paragraph 16 above. The Hargreaves Review “assessment” of the DCE which leads to this figure is predicated on the DCE incorporating “an automated mouse click for search and negotiation”. We argue that this should not be a feature of the DCE. The rest of the Hargreaves assessment goes forward in such a stunning series of leaps, assertions and estimates, that it would seem theoretically possible to put any figure as a final growth impact. The analysis needs to be a number of orders of magnitude better before any comment should be made as to its veracity.

Section 2: Definitions

23. The Feasibility Study asks for comment on its definition of the market. We broadly agree with these. Conceptually, it is useful to draw the distinction between the “large players” in market A, the mid-cap players in B, and the more business to consumer deals in market C. And as our comments above suggest, the main problem with current licensing arrangements would appear to be more around the levels of knowledge and appreciation of licensing in the market C category, than with the relatively well-functioning, copyright-savvy professional markets of A and B.
24. However, we do not believe that the concept of the DCE should be taken forward with just one of these market segments in mind (nor should it deliberately seek to exclude any from its ambit). The DCE has the potential to bring greater efficiency to all parts of the copyright licensing environment.
25. To the extent to which the market analysis is pertinent to the development of the DCE we make the following selective observations on the itemised characteristics of the digital age:
 - a. **“creative destruction of incumbent analogue businesses”** is a somewhat exaggerated way of describing the very successful transition most publishing businesses have made towards competing in the digital marketplace. With some 80% of trade books still being sold as analogue print books (due to continued consumer demand not through lack of availability of e-editions) it seems rather premature to describe this business as being “destroyed”. Likewise, in academic publishing, incumbent businesses like Elsevier, Wiley-

Blackwell, OUP and CUP have migrated to being fully-fledged digital businesses without being destroyed.

- b. **“the erosion of monopoly status”** is a highly charged term. The media and creative content business has always been highly competitive, and in the publishing sector no company has anything remotely resembling monopoly status. Ironically, the lessening of competition which has occurred in the digital age is among the internet intermediaries, where Google, Apple, Amazon, Facebook and eBay utterly dominate their respective markets.
- c. **“the ownership of content model transforms into an access model”** may be true of some parts of the sector but by no means all. The death of ownership is much exaggerated. Sales of physical books fell by only 2.4% in the first half of 2011 (the latest period for which full figures are available), which does not speak to a move from ownership, especially when put alongside sales of digital books rising by 300% in the same period. In the rush to comprehend the new, analysis has to avoid the trap of ignoring what is remaining unchanged, or assuming over-rapid substitution of delivery by analogue means.
- d. **“passive consumers become active creators”**; again this claim has to be moderated by an acknowledgement that this is only true to a limited extent and in some sectors. Not everyone who reads a book is yearning to become a generator of user-content, and it would be wrong to predicate policy on the basis that this were the case.
- e. **“the fixed internet is effectively borderless”**. For as long as government remains the preserve of nation states – even ones loosely bound together in the EU – it will remain the case that different territories will have their own views as to how to regulate the internet. Whilst the technology allows almost seamless international communication, it still allows national jurisdictions to introduce their own laws, regulations, controls and filters. Some of these may be “got around” but they are there all the same. It is unrealistic therefore to assert that copyright licensing must somehow automatically become international as well.

Closing Remarks

- 26. The PA supported the creation of a concept along the lines of a DCE before the Hargreaves Review reported. We continue in that support. We strongly dispute the Hargreaves analysis of the digital economy in copyright licensing and we disagree with many of his conclusions with regards to the need for new exceptions. However, with regards to the recommendation of the need for a DCE we do agree, whilst noting it is right but for the wrong reasons.
- 27. Again, the PA is very grateful for this opportunity to provide our views to the Secretariat and we very much look forward to engaging with you further as the study progresses.
- 28. If you would like any further information on the publishing sector please do contact me at: rmollet@publishers.org.uk, or 0207 691 9191.

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